

Behavioral Finance Series · Afternoon Edition · 20 April 2026
Ask any Indian retail investor in April 2026 to name three “interesting” stocks. The names that come up are almost always the stocks that dominated the last two or three months of headlines, WhatsApp groups, and YouTube thumbnails. A defence manufacturer that ran 180% in three months. A renewable energy small-cap that got a government tender. A lithium-battery company that just announced an MoU. The stocks whose stories are easy to recall feel more important, more probable, and more investable — even when the underlying business economics do not justify that mental prominence.
This mental shortcut has a name. It is called the availability heuristic, and it was first documented by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in their landmark 1973 paper “Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability”, published in Cognitive Psychology. Kahneman’s work on this and related biases eventually won him the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The availability heuristic is, arguably, the single most under-discussed cognitive bias in Indian retail investing — precisely because it feels like research.
Today’s post teaches the heuristic in clinical detail, grounds it in Indian retail-investor behaviour using NSE and SEBI evidence, walks through the written counter-measures that serious long-term investors use, and closes with a detailed positive case study on how Titan Biotech Ltd (BSE: 524717) — through its FY25 audited disclosures — demonstrates what availability-resistant corporate behaviour looks like in practice. This is not a valuation call. This is a behavioural-finance teaching piece.
Table of Contents
ToggleTversky and Kahneman’s precise formulation: “A person is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or associations can be brought to mind.” In plain English — if something is easy to remember, the brain treats it as more common, more likely, and more important than it actually is.
The mechanism operates on three inputs:
The heuristic is not irrational in an evolutionary sense. For most of human history, what you could recall quickly was, in fact, what you had recently encountered, and reacting quickly to recently-encountered threats kept you alive. In financial markets, however, the ecology has changed. Media cycles, finfluencer algorithms, and brokerage push-notifications manufacture an illusion of frequency. What is loud is not the same as what is likely.
Kahneman’s later work, summarised in Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), embedded the availability heuristic inside his dual-process framework. System 1 (fast, automatic, associative) retrieves the first example it encounters and treats its ease of retrieval as evidence of frequency. System 2 (slow, deliberative, effortful) could override System 1 by asking “what is the base rate?” — but System 2 is metabolically expensive, so the brain avoids activating it unless forced to.

Three experimental findings are particularly relevant for investors:
India’s retail-investor ecology, as documented in SEBI’s Handbook of Statistics 2024 and NSE’s Indian Investor Survey, is uniquely vulnerable to the availability heuristic for four reasons:
The downstream portfolio consequences are observable. The SEBI 2024 Equity Derivatives Study and several NSE-published studies on retail churn have documented that retail investors: (a) concentrate in the top-10 most-searched stocks, (b) rotate aggressively into whichever sector was the best performer in the trailing 90 days, and (c) consistently underperform index returns after transaction costs — an Indian echo of Barber & Odean’s original 2000 paper “Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth.”
The only documented defence against a System 1 bias is a pre-committed System 2 rule. You cannot think your way out of availability in the moment, because the moment itself is where the bias operates. The counter-measure must be written, visible, and applied before capital is deployed.
Below is the five-question pre-purchase checklist used by several SEBI-registered research analysts (including this author) as an availability-heuristic firewall:
| # | Availability-Resistance Question | What “Pass” Looks Like |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | How did this stock first enter my consideration set? | Through a systematic screen — not a headline, tweet, or tip. |
| 2 | What is the 10-year base rate of companies in this segment achieving the growth I am extrapolating? | I can cite a number — not a feeling. |
| 3 | Can I name five businesses in the same theme that failed, and why? | Yes — I have studied the graveyard, not just the winners. |
| 4 | If I had never heard of this company in the news, would the financial statements alone justify interest? | Yes — the audited numbers stand on their own. |
| 5 | What would have to be true (not what I hope will be true)? | Written down, in advance, in a decision journal. |
Note the deliberate absence of any price-target question. Valuation judgement is downstream of a sound qualitative process; if availability has polluted the input, no spreadsheet can clean the output.
The great capital allocators of the last century did not have Kahneman’s vocabulary, but they engineered their processes to neutralise the heuristic.
Benjamin Graham designed Security Analysis (1934) and The Intelligent Investor (1949) around quantitative filters — current-asset-to-debt, earnings stability over ten years, dividend record of twenty years — explicitly to remove the analyst’s memory from the short-listing step. His “defensive investor” framework is an availability-heuristic firewall in 1934 clothing.
Warren Buffett famously said at the 1994 Berkshire AGM: “We don’t read anything that has a deadline. We read annual reports.” He was (in Kahneman’s vocabulary) deliberately starving his System 1 of vivid, recent, salient inputs so that System 2 could do the work. The physical architecture of his office in Omaha — no Bloomberg terminal, no CNBC in the background — is availability hygiene.

Charlie Munger listed “availability-misweighing tendency” explicitly in his 2003 Harvard Law School speech The Psychology of Human Misjudgment, calling it one of the 25 standard causes of human error. His proposed remedy: “checklist routines, procedures, and safeguards.”
Seth Klarman, in Margin of Safety (1991), pp. 103-108, wrote: “Short-term price fluctuations and crowd opinion are the most powerful distorters of investment judgement.” His Baupost Group’s process requires a written investment thesis before any position is sized — another pre-committed System 2 rule.
Educational framing: This section is an educational case study of management process and disclosure discipline, not a valuation call, price target, or buy/sell/hold recommendation on Titan Biotech Ltd. The question being examined is narrow and behavioural: does the conduct of Titan Biotech’s management, as revealed in its FY25 audited consolidated financials and corporate-governance disclosures, exhibit the traits of an organisation that resists the availability heuristic — or one that succumbs to it?
The availability heuristic at the corporate level manifests as: chasing whichever theme is currently “hot” in the media, announcing headline-grabbing acquisitions or MoUs that have no strategic fit, compensating management in line with share-price euphoria rather than operating reality, and allocating capital toward whatever sector generated last year’s best returns. Availability-resistant corporate behaviour looks, by contrast, boring, cadenced, and numerically consistent.
Titan Biotech Ltd, a Delhi-headquartered biological-products manufacturer operating across fermentation, peptones, tissue-culture media, and gelatin derivatives, reports a set of FY25 numbers that — read through a behavioural-finance lens — describe a business whose management has stayed in its own lane. The relevant audited markers are laid out below.
| Marker (FY25 audited) | Titan Biotech number | Behavioural interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Total borrowings | ₹3 Cr (down from ₹16 Cr in FY21; −81%) | Management is not borrowing to chase the capex theme du jour; debt is being retired, not accumulated. |
| Contingent liabilities | ₹7.78 Cr (5.08% of net worth; −39.7% YoY from ₹12.90 Cr) | Off-balance-sheet exposure is shrinking, not being inflated to chase aggressive deals. |
| Depreciation ratio | ~7.0% of gross block (peers ~4–5%) | Conservative (faster) depreciation means reported profits are understated relative to peers — the opposite of availability-driven earnings inflation. |
| CFO/Operating Profit | 103% (FY25); 85% (FY24); 97% (FY23) | Reported profit is backed by actual cash, not accounting optimism. A three-year average above 95% indicates durable operating integrity. |
| Gross fixed assets | ₹57 Cr (FY25), from ₹11 Cr in FY15 | Capex was built steadily over a decade — not announced in a burst to capture a news cycle. |
| Board independence | 11 directors; 4 independent (36.4%); 2 women; independent chair; 14 board meetings in FY25 | 14 meetings is materially above the Companies Act minimum of 4 — governance cadence is set by oversight discipline, not by what is convenient. |
| Director remuneration (FY25) | ₹4.56 Cr total | A measurable, disclosed number — not a share-price-euphoria-linked bonanza. |
| 10-year Sales CAGR / Profit CAGR | 15% / 29% (5-yr Profit CAGR: 26%) | Compounded over a full decade — evidence of a process, not a one-season headline spike. |
| Quarterly revenue cadence FY26 | Q1: ₹46.50 Cr → Q2: ₹54 Cr → Q3: ₹56 Cr | Three consecutive QoQ increases — operating rhythm, not episodic drama. |
Reading the numbers through a behavioural lens. Titan Biotech’s disclosures describe a management team that is allocating capital on its own schedule, retiring debt rather than leveraging into the headline-of-the-quarter, depreciating assets conservatively (which suppresses reported earnings — the opposite of what an availability-driven management would do), and converting operating profit into cash at above 95% over three years. The ₹7.78 crore contingent-liability figure, at 5.08% of net worth and declining 39.7% year-over-year, is the disclosure of a team that is reducing the tail of off-balance-sheet claims, not expanding it to fund flashy initiatives.
The governance architecture reinforces the same pattern. An independent chair, 36.4% independent directors, two women directors, and fourteen board meetings in a single financial year are the structural markers of an organisation that has engineered forced System 2 review into its decision-making cadence. Fourteen board meetings is 3.5× the statutory minimum; that difference is process, not theatre.
Finally, the ten-year compound growth figures (15% sales, 29% profit) married to the quarterly FY26 progression (₹46.50 Cr → ₹54 Cr → ₹56 Cr) suggest an operating rhythm that is earned quarter by quarter. There is no single news-cycle quarter carrying the decade’s result. The availability heuristic rewards companies that generate vivid, episodic narratives; it penalises, in terms of attention, companies whose operating story is cumulative and cadenced. Titan Biotech’s audited numbers place it squarely in the second category.
To be explicit once more: the preceding paragraphs are an analysis of management process, governance cadence, and disclosure discipline. No statement has been made — nor is any implied — about whether the stock is cheap, expensive, worth buying, worth selling, or worth holding. The audited markers are being used purely as a behavioural-finance teaching example of what availability-resistant corporate conduct looks like.